


GOVERNANCE OPTIONS FOR FUTURE
VILLAGE OF PORT CHESTER
BOARD OF TRUSTEE ELECTIONS



Frontier
International Consulting


Phases of project

- *Phase I* Explore alternative governance options for Village Board of Trustee elections, especially in relation to dictates of the Voting Rights Act
- *Phase II* Analyze voting patterns by race/ethnicity and impact these patterns have on the opportunity of Hispanics to elect their candidates of choice under various governance options
- *Phase III* Draw illustrative district plans to determine possibilities for creating districts that provide Hispanic voters with the opportunity to elect candidates of choice

Hispanic population percentages, Village of Port Chester

<i>Year</i>	<i>Percent total population</i>	<i>Percent voting age population</i>	<i>Percent citizen voting age population</i>
2000	46.2	43.3	22.0
2010	59.4	56.7	33.7
2015	63.8	60.9	40.7

Hispanic voter registration in Village of Port Chester, 2008-2017



Hispanic voter turnout in Village elections since 2010

Year	Date of election	Percentage of electorate that were Hispanic
<i>Village Election: Board of Trustees (3 year term)</i>		
2010	16-Mar	16.4%
2013	19-Mar	16.9%
2016	15-Mar	23.8%
<i>Village Election: Mayor (2 year term)</i>		
2011	15-Mar	13.5%
2013	19-Mar	16.9%
2015	18-Mar	16.4%
2017	21-Mar	10.3%

Governance options considered

- Traditional at-large election system
- Districted election system
- Mixed election system
- Modified at-large election systems
 - *Cumulative voting*
 - *Limited voting*
 - *Ranked choice voting*
- Other possible changes: staggered terms, election dates

Threshold of exclusion

- Threshold of exclusion – percentage of the electorate that a group must exceed to be guaranteed a seat given the number of votes each voter can cast and the number of seats to be elected
- Traditional at-large system – threshold is 50% for all seats on the governing body
- Districted electoral system – threshold is 50% for each district individually
- Modified at-large system using limited, cumulative or ranked choice voting – threshold depends on the number of seats to be filled and the number of votes each voter can cast

Threshold of exclusion for modified at-large systems

Seats	Cumulative Voting and Ranked Choice Voting	Limited Voting		
		1 vote	2 votes	3 votes
2	33.3	33.3		
3	25.0	25.0	40.0	
4	20.0	20.0	33.3	42.9
5	16.7	16.7	28.6	37.5
6	14.3	14.3	25.0	33.3
7	12.5	12.5	22.2	30.0
8	11.1	11.1	20.0	27.3

Voting patterns by ethnicity in recent Village elections

- Voting polarized in six of the seven Village election contests examined. Despite the presence of polarization, Hispanic voters have been able to elect at least their first choice candidate (Marino in 2010) to office, and in the two most recent elections, their top two choices (Marino and Adams) to the Board.
- Hispanic voters have been increasingly cohesive in support of their preferred candidates.
- White voters provide little support for Hispanic-preferred candidates seeking positions on the Board.

Recommendations based on findings to date

Traditional at-large system

Not recommended: A traditional at-large electoral system will *not* provide Hispanics with an opportunity to elect candidates of choice. Voting is still polarized in Village elections and Hispanics do not constitute a large enough portion of the electorate to be able to elect candidates of choice under a pure at-large system.

Districted or mixed system

Acceptable if two majority Hispanic districts can be created:

Because Hispanic voters are currently able to elect two preferred candidates to the Board, a districted plan would only provide Hispanics with a comparable opportunity to elect their preferred candidates if *two* substantial Hispanic majority districts could be drawn, whether this is in conjunction with a districted or mixed system.

Modified at-large system

Acceptable under specified conditions: Cumulative voting for six seats has provided Hispanic voters the ability to elect two candidates of choice.

Limited voting (with the vote limited to one) and ranked choice voting in the context of six seats are modifications that are also likely to provide Hispanics with an opportunity to elect their preferred candidates but they have disadvantages associated with them.

Number of seats on Board

Decrease acceptable only if districted system implemented:
The current six seat cumulative voting system has provided Hispanic voters with an opportunity to elect *two* candidates of choice in recent Board elections. If the number of seats were to be decreased, this would jeopardize Hispanic voters' ability to elect two preferred candidates. The only condition under which a decrease would not be retrogressive is if a districted system with four or five districts, two of which are majority Hispanic, was adopted.

Staggered terms

Acceptable only if districted system implemented: The only possibility for introducing staggered terms would be to move to a districted system if two substantial Hispanic districts can be created.

Election date

Moving Board elections to November in even years would be acceptable but is likely to increase the Hispanic percentage of the electorate only if elections are held in presidential election years and this would require extending Board members terms of office from three years to four years.

Conclusion

Phase III of the project will involve drawing illustrative district boundaries for at least a six-district plan to determine how many substantial minority districts can be created.